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Abstract In this paper, we put forward a 4-region new economic geography
footloose entrepreneur model, in which regions are differentiated on the basis
of their size and geographical position along a line. There are two distinct
trade blocs, each of them consisting of a pair of regions. Direct and indirect
trade between all regions is allowed, whereas factor mobility can occur only be-
tween regions of the same bloc. Given this more general geographical structure,
compared to previous studies, we are able to disentangle two manifestations
of the market access effect: firms can take advantage of locating both in a
more central region (centrality effect) and/or in a bigger region (local market
size effect). The model is able to generate a plethora of long-term outcomes,
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including four equilibria with full agglomeration in each trade bloc that can be
ranked by factor owners. Equilibria where industry is dispersed or agglomer-
ated in a bloc and dispersed in the other one, are also possible as well as more
complex attractors. Finally, by allowing direct and indirect trade between re-
gions, we are able to look at the effect of trade integration on transit traffic
by evaluating in a preliminary analysis the consequences of policies aiming at
limiting transport volumes in a model with shifting industry.
Keywords New Economic Geography · Market Access · Centrality · Transit
Traffic · Industrial Agglomeration · Two-dimensional piecewise smooth map ·
Local and global dynamics
JEL classification: C62, F12, F2, R12
1 Introduction
Models of the New Economic Geography (NEG) are now widely used to assess
the effect of various policy options. These models analyze how agglomerations
(i.e. the clustering of productive factors and thus of industrial production in a
limited number of regions) may occur endogenously and underpin endogenous
cumulative processes of factor relocation.
Since the seminal paper by Krugman, 1991, a broad family of NEG models
has emerged. A mechanism common to most of these models relies on the
interplay between market access and competition effects: in monopolistically
competitive commodity markets, a region with a better market access can offer
a higher remuneration to its production factors, which in turn attracts them
even further; on the other hand, the larger the local market, the more intense
the local competition and thus the lower the factor remuneration.
It is notorious that NEG models use many simplifying assumptions; promi-
nent among them is the two-country/region setup. A recent stream of papers
shows that extending the two-region setup so as to encompass more regions
may affect traditional agglomeration patterns (see Commendatore et al., 2015a
for a comprehensive review of this literature).
In addition, NEG models usually assume regions to be symmetric (see
e.g. Fujita et al., 1999; Ikeda et al., 2012; or Castro et al., 2012). While ac-
knowledging the fact that endogenous processes may lead to second-nature
asymmetries even with symmetric regions, studying the interaction between
first-nature asymmetries and endogenous second-nature processes has proven
to be fruitful (see, for example, Krugman, 1993a, b; Fujita and Mori, 1996;
Matsuyama and Takahashi, 1998; Ago et al., 2006; Roos, 2005; Venables, 2006;
Ostbye, 2010; Agliari et al. 2011, 2015).
In this paper we develop a 4-region NEG model with first-nature asym-
metries and try to shed additional light on the role of market access. In a
two-region model, market access is primarily determined by local market size
and the access to the other region. In a multiple-region framework, a bet-
ter market access can result from a larger local market, but also from a more
central geographical location that provides a better access to external markets.
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In order to grasp the centrality aspect, we assume a specific first-nature
geography: the four regions are located on a line providing two regions with
a centrality advantage (while the two others are remote); in addition, the size
of regions alternate along the line: small, big, small, big. The first two and
the last two regions are well integrated with each other – thus we have two
integrated blocs; whereas integration between the two blocs is lower. Factor
mobility occurs only between well integrated regions, whereas commodities
are traded between all regions, at different cost levels though, reflecting the
degree of integration. This setup resembles the regional line-up encountered
in real-world examples such as that of Southern Italy, Northern Italy, Austria,
and Germany, or that of Canada, the US, Mexico and Latin America.
The interplay between centrality and local market size that is at the core of
the present paper cannot be studied in other 4-region NEG models. Closest to
our analysis are Montfort and Nicolini, 2000, Behrens, 2007, and Commenda-
tore et al., 2015b. In contrast to our paper, they assume regions of equal size.
In addition, they consider a simpler geographical set-up than in the current
paper: In Montfort and Nicolini, 2000, and Behrens, 2007, the distance from a
region in a bloc to any other region in the other bloc is the same; Commenda-
tore et al., 2015b, assume that trade can only occur between neighbouring
regions. Given the restrictive assumptions (i.e. symmetric regions and a spe-
cific simple geography), the main questions of the current paper cannot be
addressed in the existing literature; and a more general framework had to be
introduced.
The NEG framework we use is the footloose entrepreneur model; its tractabil-
ity provides some scope for analytical results also in a 4-region model. As it re-
lies on the mobility of entrepreneurs, the model is particularly suitable to study
economies with a low labour mobility. The standard footloose entrepreneur
(FE) model with two regions of different size (Baldwin et al., 2003, p. 106-
108) predicts that for low trade costs, industry will be agglomerated. For very
low trade costs, it can agglomerate in either region – the two existing core-
periphery equilibria are both possible outcomes; for somewhat higher trade
costs, industry will locate only in the bigger region – the small region losing
industry agglomeration because of its disadvantageous small local market size.
Only for high trade costs, an internal equilibrium with industry distributed
across both regions is stable.
Our model is more general and encompasses the two-region FE model as
a special case (when trade costs between blocs are prohibitive). In contrast to
many NEG studies, we set our model in discrete time, since this formulation
better represents delays inherent to any firm relocation decisions.
From an analytic point of view the resulting model is a two-dimensional
piecewise smooth noninvertible map depending on 8 parameters. It possesses
very rich dynamics including attracting fixed points and cycles of any period,
closed invariant attracting curves, chaotic attractors, and all such attractors
can coexist. We investigate the bifurcation structure of equilibria by focusing
on parameters related to trade costs and sizes of regions. In contrast to our
previous contribution (Commendatore et al., 2015b), here we focus on the
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stationary equilibria. We study their existence and stability properties, basins
of attraction, as well as the bifurcations that these fixed points can undergo.
We show that coexistence is pervasive; moreover, basins of attraction can have
quite complex structures. Given that the analytic representation of the map
is very intricate (and no longer symmetric as in Commendatore et al., 2015b),
only a few results are obtained analytically while other findings are motivated
by numerical simulations. The focus on the properties of fixed points allows
us to address the economic questions related to centrality and market size.
Indeed, from an economic point of view, our analysis focuses on three issues:
First, we study the effects of deeper trade integration – i.e. of lower trade
costs within a bloc – on regions of different size in the presence of an outside
bloc. We show that in our framework coexistence of attracting core-periphery
equilibria is also pervasive: we find that up to four different stable core-
periphery industry allocations may coexist; that the pattern of coexistence
changes when varying the trade cost within blocs; and that the sequence of
coexistence patterns sheds some light on the economic forces at work. In par-
ticular, we find that for low trade costs industry agglomeration in a region with
a small local market is possible if it is central, i.e. if it has at least some access
to an outside bloc. At the same time, we find instances in which remoteness
provides shelter from competition and facilitates the agglomeration of industry
in a small remote region. Increasing trade costs favours agglomeration in the
regions with bigger local markets. We characterize the core-periphery equilib-
ria by its indirect utilities for workers and entrepreneurs. With a still higher
trade cost, also (semi-) interior industry allocations appear to be stable and
coexisting, now with complex basins of attraction. Finally, coexisting cyclical
or complex attractors exist as well. We argue that this bifurcation sequence
also nicely corresponds to the economic forces at work.
Second, our framework allows to study a new issue, namely the effects of
trade costs between blocs. Reducing these trade costs increases the advantage
of the central regions and we find that for low trade costs between the blocs
the industry agglomerates in the two central regions. In addition, we find
other coexisting stable core-periphery equilibria: even the small remote region
may attract industry agglomeration for some range of trade costs, because it
is sheltered from competition; the other remote region is able to attract the
industry for a wider range of trade costs due to its advantageous large local
market.
Third, the geographical line-up that we have chosen allows to shed light
on another issue, namely transit traffic, i.e. the transport of commodities that
passes by some intermediary region before reaching its final destination. Be-
cause of the involved environmental burden, transit traffic is a controversial
issue debated not only in the popular press, but also in policy consulting re-
ports and in academic studies. Since in our model the coexisting attracting
equilibria involve distinct regional distributions of industry, they also imply
different levels of transit traffic. Given this coexistence, a change in transport
cost intended to reduce transit traffic may actually move the economy from
one equilibrium to another, leading to an unexpected ”jump” in transit traffic.
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Fig. 1 Geographical representation of the 4-Region economy. Arrows represent trade flows.
The size of R1 and R3 is smaller than the size of R2 and R4.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces the model frame-
work and presents the short-run equilibrium solution. Section 3 presents the
long-run dynamic process and studies core-periphery fixed points and their
stability properties. Section 4 discusses economic properties of these core-
periphery fixed points and reveals the underlying economic processes; in par-
ticular, we focus not only on industry allocations, but also on indirect utility
of workers and entrepreneurs and on transit traffic. While Sections 3 and
4 can rely on analytic results, Section 5 demonstrates with simulations that
other (coexisting) stable fixed points may also occur with increasingly complex
basins of attraction and that even attracting cycles and chaotic attractors ap-
pear. We provide some economic interpretation to these dynamic phenomena.
Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
The economy is composed of four regions, which are arranged along a line from
1 to 4 (see Fig. 1) , two sectors – Agriculture and Manufacturing – and two
factors of production – entrepreneurs and workers. The entrepreneurs are the
mobile factor, whereas workers do not move. In line with our story, we assume
that the four regions enjoy different degrees of integration, that is, region 1
(R1) is more integrated with region 2 (R2) and region 3 (R3) with region 4
(R4). One of the consequences is that entrepreneurial migration is only allowed
between R1 and R2 and between R3 and R4. The two integrated blocs (R1-
R2 and R3-R4) could be such because they belong to the same country or
because they enjoy some other type of proximity (sharing, for example, the
same language). Regions may have different sizes: specifically, we consider that
R1 and R3 could be smaller compared to R2 and R4; whereas, in order to keep
matters simple, R1 has the same size of R3 and R2 the same size of R4. This
is represented by different endowments of the immobile factor, labor L, thus:
L1 = L3 = Ls ≤ L2 = L4 = Lb (s = small region; b = big region; Lr = labor
endowment of region r). Instead, the number of entrepreneurs located in each
integrated bloc is the same and given by E/2.
Given the specific line-up of the regions, direct trade can only occur be-
tween some of the regions (i.e. those adjacent to each other; for example be-
tween R1 and R2 or between R2 and R3). However, differently from a previous
paper of ours (see Commendatore et al., 2015b), we allow for indirect trade
(e.g. R1 can export to R3, but only via R2). This gives us a completely defined
matrix of trade costs, which is based on the typical new economic geography
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(NEG) assumption of iceberg – proportional to price – trade costs:
T =

1 TC TCTD T
2
CTD
TC 1 TD TCTD
TCTD TD 1 TC
T 2CTD TCTD TC 1

where, as shown in Fig. 1, C denotes low trade costs (i.e. those incurred by
transporting commodities within the two trade blocs R1-R2 or R3-R4, i.e.
between “close” regions); and D high trade costs (i.e. those incurred by trans-
porting commodities between R2 and R3, i.e. between “distant” regions). Tak-
ing into account indirect trade costs, we are able to fill all the entries, where
the entry Tij represents the costs of trading between region i and region j:
for example trade costs between R2 and R4 – which is same in both direc-
tions – correspond to T24 = T42 = TCTD. Moreover, trade costs are nil within
each region, so that Tii = 1, and increase proportionally with distance, so
that, for example, trade costs between R1 and R2 are T12 = TC , between R1
and R3 are T12 = TCTD and the maximum possible costs are incurred when
trading between the two more remote regions T14 = T
2
CTD (thus, most of the
times, the assumed natural geography gives to the two more central regions
R2 and R3 an advantage in terms of lower trade costs). Using the typical NEG
transformation of trade cost into trade freeness parameters, we can write:
Φ =

1 φC φCφD φ
2
CφD
φC 1 φD φCφD
φCφD φD 1 φC
φ2CφD φCφD φC 1
 ,
where φij = T
1−σ
ij and where σ is defined below.
The utility function of a representative consumer, worker or entrepreneur,
is given by
U = CµMC
1−µ
A ,
where 0 < µ < 1 is the share of manufacturing expenditure, CA is the con-
sumption of the agricultural good and CM is the consumption of a CES com-
posite of manufactured varieties given by
CM =
(
n∑
i=1
c
σ−1
σ
i
) σ
σ−1
,
where ci is the consumption of variety i, n the number of available varieties
and σ > 1 the elasticity of substitution across varieties.
The budget constraint faced by the representative consumer (worker or-
ventrepreneur) is
n∑
i=1
p˜ici + pACA = m,
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where pA is the agricultural price, p˜i is the price of variety i which includes
trade costs and m is the consumer’s income.
The agricultural sector is perfectly competitive. A unit of output requires
solely 1 unit of unskilled labor.
The manufacturing sector is monopolistically competitive: identical firms
produce differentiated varieties using a technology requiring a fixed component
(an entrepreneur) and a variable component (workers), with β units of labor
for each additional unit of output. The total cost of producing qi units of
variety i is given by
TC(qi) = pii + wβqi,
where the entrepreneur remuneration pii represents the fixed cost component
and w the unitary wage.
The short-run equilibrium in period t is defined in terms of the spatial
distribution of entrepreneurs across regions in that period. The share of en-
trepreneurs in R1-R2 (resp. in R3-R4) is denoted by xt (resp. yt).
Because of zero agricultural profits, and once the agricultural good is cho-
sen as the numeraire, w = pA = 1. Each manufacturing firm faces a demand
curve with a constant elasticity −σ and optimally sets the (mill) price of its
variety as a fixed mark-up over marginal cost:
p =
σ
σ − 1β.
The income of each region is given by:
Y1,t = Ls + pi1,txt
E
2
, Y2,t = Lb + pi2,t(1− xt)E
2
, (1)
Y3,t = Ls + pi3,tyt
E
2
, Y4,t = Lb + pi4,t(1− yt)E
2
. (2)
The demand facing a firm located in each region is:
d1,t = µ
Y1,tP
σ−1
1,t + φCY2,tP
σ−1
2,t + φCφDY3,tP
σ−1
3,t + φ
2
CφDY4,tP
σ−1
4,t
pσ
, (3)
d2,t = µ
φCY1,tP
σ−1
1,t + Y2,tP
σ−1
2,t + φDY3,tP
σ−1
3,t + φCφDY4,tP
σ−1
4,t
pσ
, (4)
d3,t = µ
φCφDY1,tP
σ−1
1,t + φDY2,tP
σ−1
2,t + Y3,tP
σ−1
3,t + φCY4,tP
σ−1
4,t
pσ
, (5)
d4,t = µ
φ2CφDY1,tP
σ−1
1,t + φCφDY2,tP
σ−1
2,t + φCY3,tP
σ−1
3,t + Y4,tP
σ−1
4,t
pσ
, (6)
where Pr,t denotes the manufacturing price index in region r:
Pr,t = p
(
E
2
) 1
1−σ
∆
1
1−σ
r,t ,
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with ∆r,t given by
∆1,t = xt + φC(1− xt) + φCφDyt + φ2CφD(1− yt), (7)
∆2,t = φCxt + 1− xt + φDyt + φCφD(1− yt), (8)
∆3,t = φCφDxt + φD(1− xt) + yt + φC(1− yt), (9)
∆4,t = φ
2
CφDxt + φCφD(1− xt) + φCyt + (1− yt). (10)
The entrepreneur remuneration in region r is given by
pir,t = pqr,t − βqr,t = pqr,t
σ
,
where qr,t is the supply of a firm in region r.
Since in equilibrium, dr,t = qr,t, the entrepreneur remuneration in each
region can be rewritten by using expressions (3-6)
pi1,t =
2µ
σE
(
Y1,t
∆1,t
+ φC
Y2,t
∆2,t
+ φCφD
Y3,t
∆3,t
+ φ2CφD
Y4,t
∆4,t
)
, (11)
pi2,t =
2µ
σE
(
φC
Y1,t
∆1,t
+
Y2,t
∆2,t
+ φD
Y3,t
∆3,t
+ φCφD
Y4,t
∆4,t
)
, (12)
pi3,t =
2µ
σE
(
φCφD
Y1,t
∆1,t
+ φD
Y2,t
∆2,t
+
Y3,t
∆3,t
+ φC
Y4,t
∆4,t
)
, (13)
pi4,t =
2µ
σE
(
φ2CφD
Y1,t
∆1,t
+ φCφD
Y2,t
∆2,t
+ φC
Y3,t
∆3,t
+
Y4,t
∆4,t
)
. (14)
By substituting the income expressions (1-2) into the above expressions
and after dropping the time subscript, the system can be solved for the profits
as
pi =

pi1
pi2
pi3
pi4
 = (I− µσΦCG)−1 2µσE (ΦCL) , (15)
where
C =

1
∆1
0 0 0
0 1∆2 0 0
0 0 1∆3 0
0 0 0 1∆4
 , G =

x 0 0 0
0 1− x 0 0
0 0 y 0
0 0 0 1− y
 , L =

Ls
Lb
Ls
Lb
 . (16)
C is a matrix that shows how the interaction of enterprise location and trade
costs shape local competion and the local price index; G is a matrix giving
the geographical distribution of entrepreneurs; and L is the vector of regional
labor endowments. The explicit values for pi are presented in the Appendix A.
From the above expressions, the real profits of entrepreneurs Vr = pir/P
µ
r
can be formulated in terms of x and y.
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3 Equilibria and their stability properties
Within each integrated area, entrepreneurs have an incentive to relocate to
the region providing them with the highest indirect utility. The migration
process resembles the evolutionary replicator dynamics leading to the following
dynamic equations:
Zh(x, y) = x
[
1 + γ(1− x) V1(x, y)− V2(x, y)
xV1(x, y) + (1− x)V2(x, y)
]
,
Zf (x, y) = y
[
1 + γ(1− y) V3(x, y)− V4(x, y)
(1− y)V4(x, y) + yV3(x, y)
]
.
Taking into account the constraints 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ y ≤ 1, we are able
to define the following family of 2D piecewise smooth maps Z : R2 → I2,
I2 = [0, 1]× [0.1]:
Z :
(
x
y
)
7→

 0 if Zh(x, y) < 0,Zh(x, y) if 0 ≤ Zh(x, y) ≤ 1,
1 if Zh(x, y) > 1, 0 if Zf (x, y) < 0,Zf (x, y) if 0 ≤ Zf (x, y) ≤ 1,
1 if Zf (x, y) > 1,
 , (17)
where
Zh(x, y) = x
[
1 + γ(1− x) Ωh(x, y)− 1
1 + x(Ωh(x, y)− 1)
]
,
Zf (x, y) = y
[
1 + γ(1− y) Ωf (x, y)− 1
1 + x(Ωf (x, y)− 1)
]
,
with
Ωh(x, y) =
V1(x, y)
V2(x, y)
, Ωf (x, y) =
V3(x, y)
V4(x, y)
.
The map (17) depends on 8 parameters satisfying the following conditions:
0 < φC , φD, µ < 1, σ > 1, γ, E, Lb, Ls > 0.
3.1 Preliminaries
First note that the unit square I2 of the phase plane is invariant under the
map Z, as well as each of the borders of I2, which we denote as follows:
Ix0 = {(x, y) : y = 0} , Ix1 = {(x, y) : y = 1} ,
I0y = {(x, y) : x = 0} , I1y = {(x, y) : x = 1} .
On each of these borders, the 2D map Z is reduced to the corresponding 1D
maps, listed in Appendix B. As we shall see, they are helpful to understand
the overall dynamics of Z.
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The following notations are used for the fixed points of Z:
- Core-periphery (CP) fixed points (related to the manufacturing activity
agglomerated within both countries):
CP00 : (x, y) = (0, 0), CP11 : (x, y) = (1, 1),
CP01 : (x, y) = (0, 1), CP10 : (x, y) = (1, 0).
- Interior fixed points (related to dispersion of the industry distributed
within both countries):
IPab : (x, y) = (a, b),
with a, b 6= 0, a, b 6= 1.
- Border fixed points (related to agglomeration in a country and dispersion
in the other one):
BP0a : (x, y) = (0, a), BP1a : (x, y) = (1, a),
BPa0 : (x, y) = (a, 0), BPa1 : (x, y) = (a, 1),
with a 6= 0, a 6= 1.
Obviously, The CP fixed points always exist. Instead, the existence of the
interior and border fixed points depends on the parameters of the model. It
appears that any interior fixed point of the map Z – when it exists – is an
intersection point of the curves
Ωh =
{
(x, y) ∈ I2 : Ωh(x, y) = 1
}
, (18)
and
Ωf =
{
(x, y) ∈ I2 : Ωf (x, y) = 1
}
, (19)
that is,
IPab ∈ {Ωh ∩Ωf} .
On the other hand, for border fixed points, the following conditions hold:
BP0a ∈ {Ωf ∩ I0y} , BP1a ∈ {Ωf ∩ I1y} ,
BPa0 ∈ {Ωh ∩ Ix0} , BPa1 ∈ {Ωh ∩ Ix1} .
This information about fixed points helps to visualize their locations in the
phase plane. Note that we allow for the existence of several fixed points of the
same kind.
The stability conditions of the CP fixed points1 of Z can be derived either
in a straightforward way using eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix of Z (see
Appendix C), or using 1D maps defined on the borders of I2 (see Appendix
B). In fact, x = 0 and x = 1 are obviously the fixed points of map zx0 defined
in (28). Let λ(0) be the multiplier (or eigenvalue) of the fixed point x = 0.
1 Note that at the CP fixed points, as well as at the border fixed points, the map Z is not
differentiable. Thus, rigorously speaking one can only discuss their one-side stability (on the
other sides they are obviously always superstable). From now on, consider that the notion
of stability that applies to these fixed points is one-side stability.
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It holds λ(0−) = 0, while λ(0+) = 1 + γ(Ωh(0, 0) − 1). Due to the lower
constraint of map zx0 it always holds λ(0) ≥ 0 (in fact, if λ(0+) < 0 then the
flat branch zx0(x) = 0 ‘enters’ the interval [0, 1] so that the fixed point x = 0
becomes both-side superstable). Thus, for the stability of the fixed point x = 0
it must be that λ(0+) < 1, which corresponds to the condition Ωh(0, 0) < 1.
Similarly, it can be shown that the fixed point x = 1 of the map zx0 is stable
if the condition Ωh(1, 0) > 1 is satisfied. The same reasoning applies to the
fixed points of the 1D maps zx1, z0y and z1y, defined in (29)-(31), which leads
respectively to the following stability conditions for the CP fixed points of the
map Z:
CP00 : {Ωh(0, 0) < 1, Ωf (0, 0) < 1} , (20)
CP11 : {Ωh(1, 1) > 1, Ωf (1, 1) > 1} , (21)
CP01 : {Ωh(0, 1) < 1, Ωf (0, 1) > 1} , (22)
CP10 : {Ωh(1, 0) > 1; Ωf (1, 0) < 1} . (23)
Consider now the border fixed point BP0a. Recall that at BP0a, Ωf (0, a) =
1 holds. The eigenvalues of BP0a associated with the vertical and horizontal
directions are denoted by λv(0, a) = 1 + γa(1 − a)Ωf ′y(0, a) and λh(0, a) =
1 + γ(Ωh(0, a)− 1) respectively (see Appendix C). In the horizontal direction,
the fixed point BP0a is stable if λh(0, a) < 1, that is, if Ωh(0, a) < 1 (note
that, due to the constraints of the map Z, it always holds that λh(0, a) ≥ 0).
In the vertical direction, the fixed point BP0a is stable if |λf (0, a)| < 1, that
is, if − 2γa(1−a) < Ωf ′y(0, a) < 0. Thus, the stability conditions of fixed point
BP0a are the following:
BP0a :
{
Ωh(0, a) < 1, − 2
γa(1− a) < Ωf
′
y(0, a) < 0
}
.
In a similar way, stability conditions of the other border fixed points can be
obtained as follows:
BP1a :
{
Ωh(1, a) > 1, − 2
γa(1− a) < Ωf
′
y(1, a) < 0
}
,
BPa0 :
{
Ωf (a, 0) < 1, − 2
γa(1− a) < Ωh
′
x(a, 0) < 0
}
,
BPa1 :
{
Ωf (a, 1) < 1, − 2
γa(1− a) < Ωh
′
x(a, 1) < 0
}
.
Let us now describe bifurcations occurring when the fixed point BP0a loses
its stability. If λv(0, a) = −1, which holds for Ωf ′y(0, a) = − 2γa(1−a) , a flip
bifurcation of BP0a occurs leading to the appearance of a 2-cycle on the bor-
der I0y, while the condition λv(0, a) = 1 may be related to either a border-
transcritical (BT for short), or a fold bifurcation of BP0a. In fact, λv(0, a) = 1
if either a = 0, or a = 1, or Ωf
′
y(0, a) = 0. The first two cases are associ-
ated to BT bifurcations of BP0a at which this fixed point merges with the
CP fixed point CP00 or CP01, respectively. After the bifurcation, the fixed
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point BP0a disappears and the related CP fixed point changes its stability.
The conditions Ωf
′
y(0, a) = 0, a 6= 0, a 6= 1 correspond to a fold bifurcation
leading to appearance/disappearance of two border fixed points (note that
at the bifurcation, the curve Ωf , defined in (19), is tangent to the y-axis at
the point (x, y) = (0, a)). As for the horizontal stability of BP0a, we have that
λh(0, a) = 1 ifΩh(0, a) = 1, that is, at this bifurcationΩh(0, a) = Ωf (0, a) = 1.
So, a BT bifurcation occurs in the horizontal direction leading to the appear-
ance of an interior fixed point.
Thus, in the model defined by the map Z any CP fixed point changes its
stability due to a BT bifurcation, which is quite typical for NEG models. In
a generic case this bifurcation results in the appearance/disappearance of a
border fixed point, which in turn may undergo a flip bifurcation leading to a
2-cycle belonging to the related border, a fold bifurcation – in which case the
border fixed point disappears in a pair with another border fixed point –, or
a BT bifurcation leading to an interior fixed point.
3.2 Stability regions of CP fixed points in the (φC , φD)-parameter plane
In all the simulations of the paper, the values of the parameters µ, σ, E, γ and
Lb are fixed as
µ = 0.7, σ = 3, E = 100, γ = 20, Lb = 400, (24)
while the parameter Ls can take the following values:
Ls = 200, 300, 400.
Particular attention will be paid to the case Ls = Lb, where all the regions
have equal size.
We now investigate how the stability of the CP fixed points depends on
the parameters φC and φD.
First, in Fig.2 we show the stability regions of the CP fixed points bounded
by the BT bifurcation curves Ls = 200. In the curves of Fig.2a) ‘vs’ refers to
‘vertical stability’ associated with λv(x, y) = 1, ‘hs’ means ’horizontal sta-
bility’ associated with λh(x, y) = 1, and the numbers indicate the related CP
fixed point. For example, the curve marked ‘vs00 ’ corresponds to the condi-
tion λv(0, 0) = 1 that holds for Ωf (0, 0) = 1. A CP fixed point is stable if the
parameter point is located on the right-hand side of both bifurcation curves,
vs and hs, where the stability conditions are satisfied (see (20)-(23)). For the
considered parameter values there are four regions corresponding to different
combinations of the stable CP fixed points. Namely, in light-blue area all four
CP fixed points are stable; in the dark-gray area, the fixed points CP00, CP01
and CP10 are stable; in the light-gray area CP00 and CP01 are stable; and,
finally, in the green and the yellow areas, only one CP fixed point, CP01 and
CP00 respectively, is stable. The one-dimensional bifurcation diagram φD ver-
sus (x, y) shown in Fig.2b) corresponds to the parameter path for φC = 0.8,
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Fig. 2 In a): stability regions of the CP fixed points in the (φC , φD)-parameter plane; In
b): 1D bifurcation diagram φD versus (x, y) for φC = 0.8 related to the parameter path
indicated in a) by a red arrow. Here Ls = 200 while all the other parameters are fixed as in
(24).
0.1 < φD < 0.8, indicated by a red arrow in Fig.2a). In Fig.2b), numbered
red points indicate BT bifurcations, tick solid lines stable fixed points, while
dashed and dotted lines correspond to saddle and repelling fixed points, re-
spectively.
An example of the basins of four coexisting attracting CP fixed points is
shown in Fig.3a), where Ls = 200, φC = 0.8, φD = 0.1. These basins are
separated by the stable invariant sets of the saddle border fixed points BP0a,
BP1b, BPc0 and BPd1, whose origin is the repelling interior fixed point IPef .
In Fig.3b) we show the 1D maps zx0, zx1, z0y and z1y defined in Appendix
B (see (28)-(31), respectively), to which map Z is reduced to on the related
invariant borders of I2. In particular, one can see that the fixed points CP00
and CP01 are both-side superstable, while CP10 and CP11 are superstable on
one side.
When increasing φD, the fixed point CP11 loses its stability and becomes
a saddle via a BT bifurcation (the point BPx1 merges with CP11 and at the
bifurcation λh(1, 1) = 1, see the point (1) in Fig.2). After this bifurcation three
attracting CP fixed points coexist, CP00, CP01 and CP10 (see an example in
Fig.4 where φD = 0.19). If φD keeps on increasing, the fixed point IPxy under-
goes a BT bifurcation merging with the border point BP1y (at this bifurcation
Ωf ∩Ωh = IPxy = BP1y and λh(1, y) = 1), and then a BT bifurcation occurs
for point BPx0; at the same time the fixed point CP10 becomes a saddle (see
the point (2) in Fig.2). After this bifurcation only two attracting CP fixed
points coexist, CP00 and CP01. Then, the point CP00 loses stability and be-
comes a saddle via a BT bifurcation of the fixed point BP0y (see point (3) in
Fig.2), after which only one attracting fixed point is left, namely, CP01. The
bifurcation structure of the white parameter region in Fig.2 is investigated
later.
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Fig. 3 In a): basins of four coexisting attracting CP fixed points for φC = 0.8, φD = 0.1;
in b): 1D maps defined on the invariant borders of I2. Here Ls = 200 while all the other
parameters are fixed as in (24).
Fig. 4 In a): basins of coexisting attracting fixed points CP00, CP01 and CP10 for φC = 0.8,
φD = 0.19; in b): 1D maps defined on the invariant borders of I
2. Here Ls = 200 while all
the other parameters are fixed as in (24).
To see how the stability regions of CP fixed points in the (φC , φD)-parameter
plane depend on the parameter Ls, we show this structure for Ls = 300 in
Fig.5a), and Ls = 400 in Fig.5b).
Note that the bifurcation structure shown in Fig.5b) is associated with the
case Ls = Lb, where all four regions have equal size. In such a situation there is
an invariant line {y = 1−x} in the (x, y)-phase plane. Moreover, any invariant
set A of Z must be itself symmetric with respect to this line, or there must
exist another invariant set A′ which is symmetric to A. This property implies
that the complete phase portrait of Z has to be symmetric with respect to
the line {y = 1− x}. In particular, the ‘vertical’ and the ‘horizontal’ stability
conditions of the fixed point CP01 must coincide. The same reasoning applies
to the fixed point CP10. For the fixed points CP00 and CP11, the ‘vertical’
and ‘horizontal’ stability conditions coincide in pair. In fact, it can be seen in
Fig.5b) that vs01 = hs01, vs10 = hs10, vs00 = vs11 and hs00 = hs11.
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Fig. 5 Stability regions of the CP fixed points in the (φC , φD)-parameter plane for Ls = 300
in a) and Ls = 400 in b). All the other parameters are fixed as in (24).
4 Economic Interpretation
4.1 Stability of CP equilibria and economic forces at work
In this section, we provide an economic interpretation to the stability results
of the CP equilibria obtained in the previous section. Fig.2a) and Fig.5a),
plotted for Ls = 200 and Ls = 300, show that starting from the right bottom
corner and moving in the upward (indicated by the red arrow in Fig. 2a)) or
in the leftward direction, the stability properties of CP equilibria change when
varying φC – the trade freeness within integrated blocs – or φD – the trade
freeness between integrated blocs. The corresponding patterns depend on the
interplay between three effects:
i) centrality: regions R2 and R3 enjoy a central position in the line-up of
regions;
ii) local market size: regions R2 and R4 may take advantage of a higher
local demand. The first two effects represent two manifestations of the so-
called “market access effect” – with firms taking advantage of locating closer
to other markets or simply benefiting from a larger local demand –; and
iii) competition: firms may benefit from locating away from competitors.
In our context this latter effect is related to remoteness: regions R1 and R4
could be preferred by firms to regions R2 and R3 as a way to shelter from
competition.2
Looking at Fig.2a) and Fig.5a), we notice that:
1) in the light-blue area at the right bottom corner in the (x, y)-phase
plane – with a weak integration between blocs (low values of φD) and strong
integration within them (high values of φC) –, all CP equilibria are stable;
2 Centrality is mainly determined by φD but it is also affected by φC (by a joint effect
with φD). The higher φD, the closer are regions R2 and R3 to each other and to regions to
R1 and R4 as well. The smaller φC , the more remote regions R3 and R4 so that the relative
centrality of regions R2 and R3 increases. The connection between the trade freeness and
the competition effect is much less direct.
16 Pasquale Commendatore et al.
2) as we move in the dark-grey area by increasing φD or decreasing φC ,
CP11 loses stability so that simultaneous agglomeration in the two small re-
gions becomes impossible. The intuition for this is that as we reduce φC , anal-
ogously to what happens in the two-region asymmetric footloose entrepreneur
(FE) model,3 agglomeration in the small regions is more difficult, the indus-
trial activity located in R1 moves to R2 (since stability is lost horizontally –
i.e. in the direction of the share x –, the basin of attraction of CP11 becomes
part of that of CP01, as can be seen by comparing Fig.3 and Fig.4a), and the
competition effect loses relevance. For region R3 this effect is compensated by
centrality: an increase in φD makes regions R2 and R3 closer to each other
while R3 does not lose the industrial sector;
3) as we further decrease φC or increase φD, moving in the light-grey
region, CP10 also loses stability: agglomeration in the small remote region is
no more possible. Market size still allows for agglomeration in the large remote
region but not in the small remote region (notice that CP10 loses stability
horizontally, i.e. in the direction of the share x, with the basin of attraction
of CP00 incorporating that of CP10: entrepreneurs move from R1 to R2, the
latter region being more central and larger than the former and the need to
shelter from competition becoming less relevant);
4) when leaving the light-grey area, the direction in which we move (left-
ward or upwards) matters. More precisely, a substantial change in the qualita-
tive behaviour of the system already occurs before leaving the light-gray area,
at the value of φD corresponding to the itersection between the stability curves
vs01 and vs00. Below that value of φD any reduction of φC leads to the yellow
area – where the only stable fixed point entails agglomeration in the bigger
regions R2 and R4 – and to the prevailing of the local market size effect, as it
occurs in the two-region asymmetric FE model. Instead, above that threshold,
the prevailing force is centrality. Any movement leftward or upwards leads to
the green area – where the only stable fixed point entails agglomeration in
the central regions R2 and R3. Interesting is the case of R3: for low values
of φD, lowering φC as well could determine the loss of the industry. On the
other hand, for sufficiently high values of φD, R3 keeps the industrial sector
notwithstanting the small size of the local market . In summary, there are two
transition paths: 4a) for a sufficiently small value of φD, if we reduce φC , only
CP00 is stable, therefore only agglomeration in the two large regions is possi-
ble: the size effect prevails (CP01 loses stability in the vertical direction and its
basin becomes part of the basin of CP00: entrepreneurs move from R3 to R4);
4b) whereas for a sufficiently high value of φD, if we reduce φC or increase φD,
only CP01 is stable, therefore only agglomeration in the two central regions
is possible: the centrality effect prevails (CP00 loses stability in the vertical
3 Indeed, with a small φD the two countries are (almost) separated, so that the standard
results of the 2-R asymmetric FE model (see Baldwin et al., 2003, pp. 106-108) hold: high
trade freeness within countries – a higher φC – implies that all CP equilibria are locally
stable. As we reduce this trade freeness parameter, size gains relevance and the only stable
CP equilibrium is the one characterized by agglomeration in the largest region.
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direction and its basin becomes part of the basin of CP01: entrepreneurs move
from R3 to R4).
Notice that one can also envisage transition paths going in the opposite
direction of those just described. For example a reduction in φD – as a conse-
quence of, let’s say, a trade restriction policy – could determine a movement
from the green to the light-grey area in Fig.2a) or in Fig.5a). In this case, the
CP00 equilibrium – characterized by agglomeration in the two big regions R2
and R4 – gains local stability and its basin of attraction has a positive measure.
Therefore, a relocation of industry from region R3 to region R4 is possible. The
likelihood of this event increases as φD is further lowered. Indeed, moving in
the dark-grey area the basin of attraction of CP01 – characterized by agglom-
eration in the two central regions R2 and R3 – shrinks further and that of CP00
enlarges. Moreover, the CP10 equilibrium – characterized by agglomeration in
the two remote regions R1 and R4 – gains stability and its basin of attraction
has a positive measure (see Fig.4a). Once reached, the equilibrium CP10 also
implies a relocation of industry from region R3 to R4. Finally, lowering even
further φD, moving in the blue region, the basin of attraction of CP01 shrinks
even more and those of CP00 and CP10 become larger: for R3 the likelihood
of losing the industry increases. In the blue region, also the equilibrium CP11
is stable and its basin of attraction has a positive measure (see Fig.3a). This
equilibrium is characterized by agglomeration in the two small regions, R1 and
R3: a switch from CP01 to CP11 has no effect on the industrial concentration
in R3, determining the relocation of industry from R2 to R1.
In order to focus on the impact of centrality as the only dimension of mar-
ket accessibility, we now briefly consider the case of regions of equal size. In
Fig.5b), we set Ls = Lb, so that the size effect is nil. We see that centrality
itself can be affected in two different ways: by altering the access to the “close
market” (i.e. the market composed of the two regions belonging to the same
integrated bloc) or to the “distant market” (i.e. the market composed of the
two regions belonging to the other integrated bloc). Comparing Fig.5b) with
Fig.2a) and Fig.5a) three major differences emerge: first, the yellow area dis-
appears. This is a direct consequence of the assumption of regions of equal
size so that no region can take advantage of a larger local market; second, the
transition paths leading immediately outside the light-blue area are different:
i) moving leftward in the dark-grey region, the equilibrium CP10 loses
stability4 so that simultaneous agglomeration in both remote regions is not
possible. Due to the trade costs structure, as φC is reduced, regions R1 and
R4 become more remote thus improving the relative centrality of regions R2
and R3. This induces simultaneous entrepreneurial migration from remote to
central regions. CP00 and CP11 remain stable longer as they involve a remote
region in one integrated bloc being sufficiently close to the core of the other
integrated bloc to sustain agglomeration;
4 This occurs both horizontally and vertically – i.e both in the x and in the y directions,
so that the basin of attraction of CP01 is incorporated in the basin of CP10: entrepreneurs
move from R1 to R2 and from R4 to R3.
18 Pasquale Commendatore et al.
ii) instead, moving upwards (or leftward, if φD is sufficiently high) in the
light-grey area, the equilibria CP01 and CP10 are locally stable, so that ag-
glomeration in the two central regions or in the two remote regions are possible
outcomes. The increase in φD reduces the trade distance between central re-
gions (leaving unaffected the distance between regions within integrated blocs).
Since the reduction in φD is not too large, agglomeration in R1 and R4 – each
region being far away from the distant market – shelters firms from competi-
tion while allowing them an easy access to the market within the integrated
bloc where they are located – as φC is quite high. Instead CP00 and CP11 lose
stability because of the stronger competition effect due to the proximity to a
region – in the other integrated bloc – with agglomerated industry. 5
iii) Finally both transition paths end up in the green region where only
CP01 is stable due to the strength of the centrality effect.
Concluding this section, observe that, in all Figures, going further on the
left in correspondence of low trade freeness (especially within integrated blocs),
the interior equilibrium becomes stable and no CP equilibria (except in the
Milnor sense) is an attractor (see the discussion below).
4.2 Factors remunerations
Above, we argued that the bifurcation scenario between multiple coexisting CP
equilibria obtained in the simulations could be explained by economic forces.
We now study factor remunerations (nominal/real wages and nominal/real
profits) related to CP equilibria. In particular, we are interested in how these
factor remunerations change with lower transport costs and how they change
during transitions between two different CP equilibria. In what follows we
introduce the analytical propositions concerning the main properties of these
remunerations evaluated at the CP equilibria (see Propositions 1-3 below). We
then interpret the results with the help of numerical simulations that are also
used to highlight additional effects of φD and φC on price indices, nominal
and real profits (see Fig.s 6 and 7 below).
Real wages of workers are given by Wr = 1/P
µ
r . As price indices can
be conveniently rewritten in terms of ∆r (as given by the expression Pr,t =
p (E/2)
1
1−σ ∆
1
1−σ
r,t ), it appears that any change in trade cost is channeled through
∆r: an increase in ∆r reduces the price index and thus increases real wages (in-
direct utility) for workers and real profits for entrepreneurs. For CP equilibria,
analytical expressions of ∆r can be obtained as follows:
First we look at how the various CP equilibria affect the real wage of
workers.
5 With no size effect CP00 and CP11 are symmetric and lose stability simultaneously as
follows: the basin of attraction of CP00 and CP11 are simultaneously incoporated in the
basin of attraction of CP01 as CP00 loses vertical stability (in the y direction) and CP00
horizontal stability (in the x direction): entrepreneurs move from R1 to R2 and from R4 to
R3.
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CP00 CP01 CP10 CP11
∆1 φC (φCφD + 1) φC (φD + 1) φ
2
CφD + 1 φCφD + 1
∆2 φCφD + 1 φD + 1 φC (φD + 1) φC + φD
∆3 φC + φD φD + 1 φC (φD + 1) φCφD + 1
∆4 φCφD + 1 φC (φD + 1) φ
2
CφD + 1 φC (φCφD + 1)
Table 1 Expressions of ∆r for CP equilibria
Proposition 1 (i) CP equilibria are ranked by workers.
(ii) In a CP equilibrium, an increase in φC or φD leads to higher workers’
real wages in all regions.
Proof (i) Since φC (φCφD + 1) < φC (φD + 1) < φ
2
CφD + 1 < φCφD + 1, in
region 1 PCP111 < P
CP10
1 < P
CP01
1 < P
CP00
1 holds, and in region 4 P
CP00
4 <
PCP104 < P
CP01
4 < P
CP11
4 . Since φC (φD + 1) < φC + φD < φCφD + 1 <
φD + 1, in region 2 P
CP01
2 < P
CP00
2 < P
CP11
2 < P
CP10
2 holds, and in region 3,
PCP013 < P
CP11
3 < P
CP00
3 < P
CP10
3 . (ii) As all ∆r depend positively upon trade
freeness, a reduction in either trade cost φC or φD unambiguously decreases
price indices, thus increasing real wages Wr in all regions.
We interpret the ranking of CP fixed points by workers in Proposition 1
as follows. According to Part (i), the price index is the lowest, if the region
under consideration has the industry agglomeration and if there is industry
in the closest region of the other bloc as well; the price index increases, if the
region under consideration keeps the agglomeration, but industry is no longer
in the closest region of the other bloc, but in the more distant one; the price
index further increases if the region under consideration loses the industry,
but industry is located in the closest region of the other bloc; finally, the price
index is the highest, if neither the region under consideration nor the closest
region in the other bloc has industry. Part (ii) of the Proposition means that
in a CP fixed point, trade liberalization, both within and between integrated
blocs, is beneficial for all workers.6
Entrepreneurs also enjoy a lower price index. However, their real remunera-
tion depends upon both nominal profits and the price index. Analytical expres-
sions for nominal profits can be derived. We now summarize in the following
Proposition how trade openness affect nominal and real profits depending on
the agglomeration pattern.
Proposition 2 (i) When agglomerations occur in both central regions (i.e. in
the CP01 equilibrium), an increase in either freeness of trade φC or φD leads
to higher real profits of entrepreneurs in both central regions.
(ii) When agglomerations occur in a central region and a remote region (i.e.
in the CP00 and CP11 equilibria), an increase in φD leads to higher nominal
and real profits of entrepreneurs in the central region and to lower nominal
profits in the remote region if φD <
√
(σ − µ)/(σ + µ).
6 In CP01, an increase in φC has no effect on price indices in R2 and R3. This is the only
exception.
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(iii) When agglomerations occur in both remote regions (i.e. in the CP10
equilibrium), an increase in φD leads to higher nominal and real profits of
entrepreneurs in the large remote region when φD <
√
(σ − µ)/(σ + µ)/φC .
(iv) When agglomeration occurs in the small remote region (i.e. in the
CP10 and CP11 equilibria), an increase in φC leads to higher nominal and real
profits in that region. When agglomeration occurs in the large remote region
(e.g. as in CP00 or CP10), an increase in φC leads to higher nominal and
real profits in that region if firms in the other country agglomerate in the large
central region. Otherwise (that is if firms in the other country agglomerate in
the small remote region), nominal profits in the large remote region decrease
with φC .
(v) When agglomeration occurs in only one central region (e.g. in CP00 or
CP11), an increase in φC leads to lower nominal profits in that region. When
agglomeration occurs in both central regions (i.e. in CP01), nominal profits are
insentive to changes in φC or φD.
Proof (i) It can be shown that piCP013 = pi
CP01
2 = 2µ (Lb + Ls) /E/(σ − µ).
Therefore, lower price indices lead to higher real profits.
(ii) In the CP00 equilibrium, nominal profits in region 2 are given by
piCP002 =
2µSCP002
E (σ − µ) (φC + φD) (σ − µ+ (σ + µ)φCφD)
where
SCP002 = φC (σ + µ) (Lb + Ls)φ
2
D +
+
(
Lb
(
σ − µ+ (σ + µ)φ2C
)
+ 2Ls
(
µφ2C − µ+ σ
))
φD +
+φC (σ − µ) (Lb + Ls)
with
∂pi
CP00
2
∂φC
< 0, and
∂pi
CP00
2
∂φD
> 0 for φD <
√
σ−µ
σ+µ . Moreover, we have
piCP004 =
2µSCP004
E (σ − µ) (φC + φD) (σ − µ+ (σ + µ)φCφD)
where
SCP004 = φC (σ + µ) (Lb + Ls)φ
2
D +
+
(
Lb
(
σ − µ+ (σ + µ)φ2C
)
+ 2Lsσφ
2
C
)
φD +
+φC (σ − µ) (Lb + Ls)
with
∂pi
CP00
4
∂φC
> 0, and
∂pi
CP00
4
∂φD
< 0 for φD <
√
σ−µ
σ+µ .
Similarly, in CP11, nominal profits in region 3 are given by
piCP113 =
2µSCP113
E (σ − µ) (φC + φD) (σ − µ+ (σ + µ)φCφD)
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where
SCP113 = φC (σ + µ) (Lb + Ls)φ
2
D +
+
(
Ls
(
σ − µ+ (σ + µ)φ2C
)
+ 2Lb
(
µφ2C − µ+ σ
))
φD +
+φC (σ − µ) (Lb + Ls)
with
∂pi
CP11
3
∂φC
< 0, and
∂pi
CP11
3
∂φD
> 0 for φD <
√
σ−µ
σ+µ . Finally, we also have
piCP111 =
2µSCP111
E (σ − µ) (φC + φD) (σ − µ+ (σ + µ)φCφD)
where
SCP111 = φC (σ + µ) (Lb + Ls)φ
2
D +
+
(
Ls
(
σ − µ+ (σ + µ)φ2C
)
+ 2Lbσφ
2
C
)
φD +
+φC (σ − µ) (Lb + Ls)
with
∂pi
CP11
1
∂φC
> 0, and
∂pi
CP11
1
∂φD
< 0 for φD <
√
σ−µ
σ+µ .
(iii) In the CP10 equilibrium, nominal profits in region 4 are given by
piCP104 =
2µSCP104
E (σ − µ) (φD + 1) (σ − µ+ (σ + µ)φ2CφD)
where
SCP104 = φ
2
C (σ + µ) (Lb + Ls)φ
2
D +
+2
(
Lb
(
σ + µ
(
φ2C − 1
))
+ Lsσφ
2
C
)
φD +
+ (σ − µ) (Lb + Ls)
with
∂pi
CP10
4
∂φC
< 0, and
∂pi
CP10
4
∂φD
> 0 for φD <
1
φC
√
σ−µ
σ+µ
(iv) In the CP10 equilibrium, nominal profits in region 1 are given by
piCP101 =
2µSCP101
E (σ − µ) (φD + 1) (σ − µ+ (σ + µ)φ2CφD)
where
SCP101 = φ
2
C (σ + µ) (Lb + Ls)φ
2
D +
+
(
2Ls
(
σ + µ
(
φ2C − 1
))
+ 2Lbσφ
2
C
)
φD +
+ (σ − µ) (Lb + Ls)
with
∂pi
CP10
1
∂φC
> 0, and
∂pi
CP10
1
∂φD
< 0 for φD <
1
φC
√
σ−µ
σ+µ . In CP11, nominal profits
in region 1 are such that
∂piCP111
∂φC
> 0 as shown already in part (ii).
(v) From parts (i) and (ii), we have
∂pi
CP00
2
∂φC
< 0,
∂pi
CP11
3
∂φC
< 0, and piCP013 =
piCP012 depend neither on φD nor on φC .
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We now compare how nominal profits in a region change during a transition
from one CP equilibrium to another.
Proposition 3 (i) The nominal profit in a central region or in the large re-
mote region is larger when firms in the other country agglomerate further away.
(ii) The nominal profit in the small remote region is larger when firms in
the other country agglomerate further away if φC is sufficiently large or if φD
is sufficiently small.
Proof (i) It can be shown that piCP002 > pi
CP01
2 , pi
CP11
3 > pi
CP01
3 , and pi
CP10
4 >
piCP004 . (ii) pi
CP10
1 > pi
CP11
1 as long as Aφ
2
D + BφD + C > 0 where A =
φC(σ+µ)[(1−φC)Lb−Ls], B = −Ls[σ−µ+φ2C(σ+µ)] < 0 and C = −(σ−
µ)[Lb(1 − φC) + LsφC ] < 0. The sign of A is indeterminate. If φC > Lb−LsLb ,
A is negative, then piCP111 − piCP101 < 0 always. If φC < Lb−LsLb then A is
positive and piCP111 − piCP101 < 0 for φD < φ˜D = −B+
√
B2−4AC
2A where φ˜D
is real, positive and the larger root in absolute value of the equation Aφ2D +
BφD + C = 0. φD < φ˜D is a necessary and sufficient condition in order to
have piCP111 − piCP101 < 0. Maybe, it could be of some interest to show that
φD <
√
1
φC
√
σ−µ
σ+µ is a sufficient condition. We proceed as follows: notice first
that for B = 0, φ˜D =
√−4AC
2A and for B < 0, φ˜D =
−B+√B2−4AC
2A >
√−4AC
2A .
Then consider that
√−4AC
2A decreases continuously with Ls and at Ls = 0√−4AC
2A =
√
1
φC
√
σ−µ
σ+µ .
7 Therefore for Ls > 0 (that gives B < 0) φ˜D is always
larger than
√
1
φC
√
σ−µ
σ+µ and it is equal to it when Ls > 0 (that gives B < 0).
In summary, piCP111 − piCP101 < 0 if and only if φC > Lb−LsLb or φC < Lb−LsLb
and φD < φ˜D or if φD <
√
1
φC
√
σ−µ
σ+µ .
The effects outlined in Propositions 1-3 are now illustrated by numerical
simulations, see Fig.s 6 and 7. In these Figures, for each region, the first two
panels show price indices and nominal profits as a function of φD (in Fig.6)
or φC (in Fig.7). In the Figures, these variables are plotted as long as the
corresponding equilibrium is locally stable. While the real wage of workers
corresponds to the inverse of the price index, the real profit of entrepreneurs
can be obtained as the ratio of the nominal profit and the price index. Specific
colors refer to the various CP equilibria (red relates to CP00, blue to CP01,
green to CP10, and pink to CP11). We consider Ls = 200 and set the other
parameters as in the previous simulations.8
7 We could have checked directly the sign of the derivative ∂φ˜D/∂Ls, however that was
not possible to evaluate given the lenght of the corresponding expression.
8 These are: Lb = 400, E = 100, β = 1, µ = 0.7 and σ = 3. The value of σ = 3 implies
a mark-up σ
σ−1 = 1.5. In Fig.6 the value of φC is set to 0.9 and φD varies from 0.1 to 0.8.
With these parameters, the trade costs are around the following values: TC = φ
1
1−σ
C = 1.118
for φC = 0.8, TD = φ
1
1−σ
D = 3.162 for φD = 0.1 and TD = 1.118 for φD = 0.8; and in Fig.7
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Fig. 6 Abscissa: φD is varied from 0.1 to 0.8. Ordinate: three different welfare indicators.
Different colours refer to different distibution of entrepreneurs: Red CP00; blue CP01, green
CP10, pink CP11. Parameters setting: Ls = 200, Lb = 400, µ = 0.7, σ = 3, φC = 0.8, β = 1,
E = 100.
Proposition 1 can be illustrated as follows. Considering region 1, the first
frame in Figs 6 and 7 show that: the price index is the lowest along the pink
line, where the CP11 equilibrium prevails (with agglomeration in R1 and R3);
the second lowest along the green line, where the CP10 equilibrium prevails
(with agglomeration in R1 and R4); the second highest along the blue line,
where the CP01 equilibrium prevails (with agglomeration in R2 and R3); and,
finally, the highest along the red line, where the CP11 equilibrium prevails
(with agglomeration in R2 and R4). Corresponding results for the other regions
are illustrated in Figs 6 and 7. We conclude that workers closer to the industry
– located in both integrated blocs – incur smaller trade costs, thus enjoying
smaller price indices and in turn higher real wages. The opposite occurs to
workers who are more distant to the industry: because of higher commodity
prices due to higher trade costs, their real wages are lower. The beneficial
the value of φD is set to 0.1 and φC varies from 0.2 to 0.8. With these parameters the trade
costs are: TD = 3.162 for φD = 0.1, TC = 2.236 for φC = 0.2 and TC = 1.118 for φC = 0.8.
We consider reasonable these values.
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Fig. 7 Abscissa: φC is varied from 0.2 to 0.8. Ordinate: three different welfare indicators.
Different colours refer to different distibution of entrepreneurs: Red CP00; blue CP01, green
CP10, pink CP11. Parameters setting: Ls = 200, Lb = 400, µ = 0.7, σ = 3, φD = 0.1, β = 1,
E = 100.
effect of lower price indices – due to the proximity to manufactured commodity
markets – on workers is magnified by the increase in either trade freeness.
Proposition 2 refers to the effect of both types of trade freeness on regional
profits in each CP equilibria. Parts (i)-(iii) are mainly concerned with the
effects of φD on nominal profits: these are illustrated in Fig.6. Consider the
case where industry is agglomerated in central regions (as in the equilibria
CP00, CP01 and CP10 – represented in Fig.6 by the red, blue and green lines):
if φD is not too high, by increasing this trade freeness, nominal profits are
stationary or rise. This result illustrates the effect of centrality. On the other
hand, when industry agglomeration occurs in remote regions (as in CP00, CP10
and CP11 – represented by the red, green and pink lines in Fig.6), nominal
profits only increase in the large remote region – under the effect of a bigger
market size – when industry is agglomerated in both remote regions (that is, in
the CP11 equilibrium – represented by the pink line in Fig.6) and decrease in all
other cases. When φD is sufficiently high, especially referring to the equilibria
CP00, CP01 and CP11, some of these effects could be reversed. However, as
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confirmed by numerical simulations (see Fig.6 as an example), this occurs
when these equilibria are no longer stable.
Parts (iv)-(iv) deal with the effects of φC on nominal profits: these are
illustrated in Fig.7. A change in φC has a non ambiguous effect on nominal
profits in each region. First consider the CP11 equilibrium with agglomeration
in R1 and in R3 – the two small regions –, as represented by the pink line
in Fig.7. Here, when φC increases, profits increase in R1 and decrease in R3.
This is due to the fact that R1 is becoming less remote and R3 more subject
to competition originating from R1. Consider now the CP10 equilibrium with
agglomeration in R1 and R4 – the two remote regions – as represented by the
green line in Fig.7. In this equilibrium, profits are increasing in φC in R1 and
are decreasing in R4: the size effect loses relevance with a stronger integration
within trade blocs. Consider now the CP01 equilibrium with agglomeration in
R2 and R3 – the two central regions – as represented by the blue line in Fig.7.
Here (as shown in the proof of Proposition 2), profits do not depend on trade
costs. Obviously, centrality does not play any role (both regions are equally
central), whereas market size affects profits only via the sum (Lb + Ls), that
is, via the relative size of the workers population, the local immobile demand.9
Finally consider the CP00 equilibrium with agglomeration in R2 and R4 – the
two large regions – as represented by the red line in Fig.7. Analogously to the
case of agglomeration in the two small regions, market size does not play any
role. An increase in φC favours R4 relative to R3 because the former region
becomes less remote and the latter one more subject to competition.
A consequence of Proposition 1 Part (ii) on the effects φD and φC on
price indices and of Proposition 2 Parts (i-v) on the effects of φD and φC
on nominal profits is that when nominal profits rise due to an increase in
either trade freeness, real profits increase as well. In addition when nominal
profits decrease with φD in some region, numerical simulations suggest that
real profits still increase with φD.
10 In other words, the price index effect always
dominates any decrease in nominal profits so that real profits do increase with
trade liberalization between integrated blocs.11
According to Proposition 3, nominal profits are higher in a region where
industry agglomerates if industry in the other bloc agglomerates in the more
distant region. Profits in a region are lower when the industry in the other
bloc agglomerates in the closer region as a consequence of stronger compe-
tition. This result always holds except when industry is agglomerated in the
9 The size effect, via a change in the trade freeness within integrated blocs (φC), could
still play a role by affecting the local stability properties of the CP01 equilibrium. Indeed,
a sufficient reduction of φC , if φD is not too high, could determine a loss of stability of
CP01 in the vertical direction, i.e. in the direction of the share y (see Figs 2a) and 5a)),
and a relocation of the industrial sector from R3 to R4, as CP00 becomes the only stable
equilibrium.
10 These simulations, not presented here, are used in substitution of analytical results that
cannot be obtained for these cases.
11 Regarding the effect of φC , we found some numerical simulations where trade liberal-
ization within trade blocs induce nominal and real profits to move in the same direction
notwithstanding the counterbalancing of the price index effect.
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small remote region and φC is sufficiently small and φD is sufficiently large.
12
However, as confirmed by numerical simulations (see for example Fig.7), this
latter scenario does not occur while the respective equilibrium is still stable.
4.3 Effect on transit traffic
The geographical line-up that we have chosen allows to shed light on another
issue, namely transit traffic, i.e. the transport of commodities that passes by
some intermediary region before reaching its final destination. Because of the
often involved environmental burden, transit traffic is a hotly debated issue
not only in the popular press, but also in policy consulting reports and in
academic studies (see e.g. Marletto, 2010; Sutton, 2013; Enchelmaier, 2013).
Very often, a CGE framework is used (see e.g. Steininger, 2002 and for sur-
veys Steininger, 1999; Bo¨hringer and Lo¨schel, 2006) to analyze whether policy
instruments that change transport costs can affect the modal split (i.e. the
transport shift to less polluting modes of transportation) and whether these
instruments can reduce trade and transport volumes. However, less attention
is paid to the location choice of individuals and firms that can potentially
affect traffic patterns (see Grazi and van den Bergh, 2008; see also the inter-
esting study by Bednar-Freidl et al., 2011, that focuses on residential location
choice and commuting traffic, but not on firm location choices or commodity
transport). In this modeling framework, the response of transport volumes to
policy instruments is smooth.
In contrast, the NEG approach allows for explicit firm location choices. As
such, the NEG may naturally complement the result of CGE studies. Here we
provide first insights into these issues.
Our model allows to analyze the impact of economic integration that affects
transport costs and in turn transit traffic. For this purpose, trade flows are
derived by using the matrices Φ and G introduced in Section 2:
D =
µ
p
GΦY, (25)
where the element Drs denotes the quantity produced in region r and sold in
region s and Y denotes the regional income levels
Y =

Y1
Y2
Y3
Y4
 = L+E2 Gpi. (26)
12 A possible explanation is that as φD becomes smaller competition from the central
region in the other bloc reduces its intensity; whereas as φC becomes larger the competition
from the larger region in the other bloc increases its intensity.
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Given the specific geographical line-up of regions, transit traffic generated
by indirect trade can be written as
Trans =

0
D13 +D14 +D31 +D41
D14 +D24 +D41 +D42
0
 . (27)
The first and fourth entries of Trans are necessarily equal to zero because
no traffic passes through regions 1 and 4 given the line-up of regions. The
second and third entries account for the traffic passing through region 2 and
3 respectively.
Given the complex structure of our model, no analytical results regarding
transit traffic are available. Fig.s 6 and 7 illustrate the effect of φD and φC on
transit traffic by relying on numerical simulations. Our findings suggest the
following regularities:
(i) In every CP equilibrium, reducing the trade freeness (i.e. increasing
transport costs) increases price indices and thus reduces trade volumes and
transit traffic. The response of transit traffic is continuous: an increase in
trade costs smoothly reduces transit traffic.
(ii) There is a clear ordering of CP equilibria: A region (R2 or R3) is less
exposed to transit traffic, if it has attracted all industry within the bloc and
the industry in the other bloc is distant. If a region has no industry, it is still
better off, when the industry in the other bloc is distant. The worst possible
case is when the region has no industry and is located in between two Cores.
(iii) Finally, given the different parameter ranges for which each CP equi-
librium is stable, discontinuous jumps in transit traffic are possible: Once trade
freeness crosses a threshold, a sudden change in the long run regional distri-
bution of industrial activity may happen and a region may lose its industrial
agglomeration. In that case, transit traffic jumps upwards in a discontinuous
way. This kind of result is only possible in models exhibiting multiple equilibria
such as those of the NEG.
This discussion shows that neglecting firm location choice may actually
mislead policy advice: An increase in trade costs may initially smoothly reduce
transit traffic; however, if a threshold is crossed, a further increase in trade
costs may trigger industry relocation and in turn upward jumps – as opposed
to smooth reductions – in transit traffic.
5 Complex dynamics
Let us investigate now the complete bifurcation structure of (φC , φD)-parameter
plane. The parameter region which is left uncolored in Fig.s 2a) and 5 is asso-
ciated with more complex dynamics. As we show below, for parameter values
belonging to this region map Z can have various attractors, such as a border
fixed point, an interior fixed point, a cycle of any period (belonging to a border
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or an interior cycle), cyclic closed invariant curves, as well as chaotic attrac-
tors, moreover, some of these attractors can coexist (see, e.g. Mira et al., 1996,
where properties of 2D noninvertible maps are studied, and Wiggins, 2003, for
a general bifurcation theory).
A peculiarity of map Z is related to the fact that besides standard attrac-
tors this map can have attractors in Milnor sense (see Milnor, 1985), which are
caused by the ‘flat’ branches of Z. Recall that (1) according to the most spread
definition, an attractor is a closed invariant set with a dense orbit, which has
a neighborhood each point of which is attracted to the attractor13, while (2)
an attractor in Milnor sense does not require existence of such a neighbor-
hood, but only a positive measure set of points attracted to the attractor.14 In
fact, definition (2) of an attractor obviously includes also attractors with an
attracting neighborhood, as in definition (1). For short we say that a set is M -
attractor if it is attracting in Milnor sense, but not in a sense of the definition
(1). In such a way, an M -attractor has no an attracting neighborhood, but it
has a basin of attraction of positive measure. For example, a CP fixed point
which is locally repelling can be an M -attractor, with quite a large basin of
attraction.
In Fig.8a) we present an enlargement of the window indicated in Fig.5a)
where regions related to attracting cycles of different periods n ≤ 23 are shown
by different colors (periods of the largest regions are indicated by numbers),
white region is associated either with cycles of higher periods, or with chaotic
attractors, pink and red regions correspond to attracting border and interior
fixed points, respectively, and dark gray region is related to M -attracting
CP fixed points denoted CPM . To clarify which bifurcations occur at the
transitions from one area to another we show in Fig.8b) a 1D bifurcation
diagram φC versus (x, y) (note that values of φC are shown decreasing) for
fixed φD = 0.1, which corresponds to the parameter path indicated by the
horizontal arrow in Fig.8a). Given that only one initial point is used to produce
Fig.8a), coexisting attractors cannot be seen in this figures. To clarify this issue
we show below several examples of basins of coexisting attractors.
Let us first comment on the bifurcations occurring for parameter values in-
dicated by numbers (1)-(6) in Fig.8. For decreasing φC first, at φC ≈ 0.2295,
a BT bifurcation of the saddle fixed point CP10 occurs in the vertical direc-
tion (the related parameter point is indicated by (1)) at which CP10 becomes
repelling merging with a repelling border fixed point BP1y which is born a
bit before, at φC ≈ 0.2389, due to a fold bifurcation (see the black circle in
Fig.8b)) in a pair with a saddle border fixed point BP ′1y. Then at φC ≈ 0.1962
the attracting fixed point CP00 becomes locally a saddle via a BT bifurca-
13 More precisely, an attracting set A of a map f is a closed invariant set for which a
neighborhood U(A) exists such that f(U(A)) ⊂ U(A) and fn(x) → A as n → ∞ for any
x ∈ U(A). An attractor A is an attracting set with a dense orbit.
14 More presicely, a Milnor attractor is a closed invariant set A ⊂ J such that the set
ρ(A), consisting of all the points x ∈ J for which ω-limit set ω(x) ⊂ A, has strictly positive
measure, and there is no strictly smaller closed subset A′ of A such that ρ(A′) coincides
with ρ(A) up to a set of measure zero.
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Fig. 8 In a): bifurcation structure of window indicated in Fig.5a); In b): bifurcation diagram
φC versus (x, y) for φD = 0.1 related to the parameter path indicated in a) by an arrow.
Note that values of φC are shown decreasing. Here Ls = 300 while all the other parameters
are fixed as in (24).
tion in vertical direction (in Fig.8 this bifurcation is marked by (2)) that
leads to the appearance of an attracting border fixed point BP0y. If we con-
tinue to decrease φC , at φC ≈ 0.173 the saddle fixed point CP01 undergoes
a BT bifurcation in the horizontal direction (see the point (3) in Fig.8) and
becomes repelling leading to the appearance of a saddle border fixed point
BPx1. Then at φC ≈ 0.1659 the attracting border fixed point BT0y undergoes
a BT bifurcation in the horizontal direction (see the point (4)) leading to an
attracting interior fixed point IPxy. A BT bifurcation of CP00 in horizontal
direction occurring at φC ≈ 0.1534 (see the point (5)) transforms the saddle
fixed point CP00 into a repelling one and gives birth to a saddle border fixed
point BPx0. First period-doubling bifurcations of the border and interior fixed
points are indicated in Fig.8 by gray circles. Period-doubling bifurcation of
the interior fixed point occurs at φC ≈ 0.1481. Each border 2-cycle undergoes
a cascade of period-doubling bifurcations leading to chaos, while an interior
2-cycle undergoes a Neimark-Sacker bifurcation resulting in appearance of 2-
cyclic attracting closed invariant curves (we show below an example of such
an attractor). Orange circles in Fig.8 indicate homoclinic bifurcations leading
to disappearance of chaotic attractors on the related borders of I2, as well as
disappearance of an interior chaotic attractor.
Let us clarify the described above bifurcation sequence presenting several
examples of basins of coexisting attractors.
For 0.1962 / φC / 0.2295 (see the range of φC between the points (2) and
(1) in Fig.8) map Z has a unique attractor which is fixed point CP00, while
for 0.1659 / φC / 0.1962 (see the range between the point (4) and (2)) map
Z has coexisting attracting fixed point BP0a and M -attracting fixed point
CP00: Fig.9a) shows basins of attraction of these fixed points at φC = 0.196,
and in Fig.9b) the 1D maps defined on the related borders of I2 are presented.
It becomes clear why fixed point CP00 is an M -attractor if one looks at the
graph of map z0y defined on border I0y: even if locally the fixed point y = 0 is
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Fig. 9 In a): coexisting attracting fixed point BP0a (with blue basin) and M -attracting
fixed point CP00 (with red basin) for φC = 0.196, φD = 0.1; in b): 1D maps defined on the
invariant borders of I2. Here Ls = 300 while all the other parameters are fixed as in (24).
Fig. 10 In a): coexisting attracting fixed point IPef (with orange basin),M -attracting fixed
points CP00 and BP0a (with red and blue basins, respectively) for φC = 0.159, φD = 0.1;
in b): 1D maps defined on the invariant borders of I2. Here Ls = 300 while all the other
parameters are fixed as in (24).
already repelling and initial points from its right neighborhood are attracted
to fixed point y = a, it has quite a large basin of attraction shown in Fig.9b)
in red. Indeed, any point of the interval associated with the flat branch of z0y,
as well as any its preimage, is mapped into y = 0 in a finite number of steps.
Respectively, initial points belonging to the red islands Fig.9a) are mapped
into CP00 in a finite number of steps (in particular, points from the largest
red island are mapped into CP00 in one step).
For 0.1534 / φC / 0.1659 (see the range between the point (5) and (4) in
Fig.8) map Z has coexisting attracting fixed point IPef and two M -attracting
fixed points, CP00 and BP0a. An example of their basins is shown in Fig.10
where φC = 0.159. Note that map z1y has an attracting 2-cycle which for map
Z is a period-2 saddle cycle.
For 0.1481 / φC / 0.1534 (see the range between the point (6) and (5)
in Fig.8) map Z has coexisting attracting fixed point IPef and three M -
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attracting fixed points, CP00, BP0a and BPc0. An example of their basins is
shown in Fig.11a) where φC = 0.15.
As already mentioned, for decreasing φC the fixed point IPef undergoes
a period-doubling bifurcation leading to an interior 2-cycle which then under-
goes the Neimark-Sacker bifurcation. As a result of this bifurcation 2-cyclic
attracting closed invariant curves are born. Fig.11b) presents an enlarged part
of the basin of such an attractor for φC = 0.1398, as well as basins of coexisting
M -attracting fixed points CP00, BPc0 and M -attracting 2-cycle {C0a1 , C0a2}
belonging to the border I0y. If we continue to decrease φC 2-cyclic closed in-
variant curves are transformed in a chaotic attractor. An example of 2-cyclic
chaotic attractor is shown in Fig.12 for φC = 0.1375, which is near its final
bifurcation occurring due to a contact of the attractor with its basin boundary.
Also the bifurcation sequence detected in Fig.8 allows for a neat economic
interpretation that complements the discussion on the role of centrality and
local market size initiated in Section 4. In that section, for low values of φD, we
detected a sequence starting with the simultaneous stability of all four possible
CP equilibria for high values of φC and ending with CP00 (i.e. agglomeration
in the big regions), as unique stable equilibrium. Here, when reducing φC fur-
ther, CP00 loses vertically local stability, but it gains global stability as an
M -attractor, and the coexisting stable equilibrium BP0a appears, involving
the spreading of industry between regions 3 and 4, while industry is still ag-
glomerated in region 2; at still lower values of φC , the stable equilibrium IEef
is born, involving dispersion of the industry across all regions, coexisting with
the other two attractors. This sequence reflects the fact that region 3, though
having a small local market, enjoys the advantage of centrality; therefore, in-
dustry from the big region 4 partly moves to the small region 3; region 2 keeps
the core for a larger range of φC values because it enjoys both, centrality and
a large local market.
Interestingly enough, for still lower values of φC , BPc0 appears, involving
an equilibrium in which industry is spread between regions 1 and 2, and ag-
glomerated in region 4. Industry in region 4 takes advantage of the big local
market and of the shelter from competition.
In contrast to Section 4, the basins of attraction exhibit a quite complex
structure. Therefore, abrupt transitions between the different types of equilib-
ria are more likely to occur. Since the equilibria involve quite distinct patterns
of industry location, abrupt changes in transit traffic are also expected. This
reinforces our argument developed above according to which policy advice
neglecting side effects upon industry location might be seriously misleading.
Finally, our analysis reveals that long run equilibria exhibit not only sta-
tionary industry allocations, but also cyclical and/or chaotic attractors with
a continuous movement of industry between the regions. Thus, continuous
movements between regions may not only be driven by stochastic shocks, but
by deterministic economic forces at work in our non-linear NEG model, as
discussed above.
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Fig. 11 In a): coexisting M -attracting fixed points CP00, BP0a and BPc0 (with red, blue
and dark-green basins, respectively) and attracting fixed point IPef (with orange basin) for
φC = 0.15; In b): an enlarged part of the phase plane with coexisting M -attracting fixed
points CP00 and BPc0 (with red and dark-green basins, respectively), M -attracting 2-cycle
{C0a1 , C0a2} (with blue basin) and 2-cyclic closed invariant curves (with orange basin) for
φC = 0.1398. Here Ls = 300 while all the other parameters are fixed as in (24).
Fig. 12 An enlarged part of the phase plane with coexisting M -attracting fixed points CP00
and BPc0 (with red and dark-green basins, respectively), M -attracting 2-cycle {C0a1 , C0a2}
(with blue basin) and 2-cyclic chaotic attractor (with orange basin) for φC = 0.1375. Here
Ls = 300 while all the other parameters are fixed as in (24).
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we developed a 4-region new economic geography (NEG) model
– by extending the standard 2-region Footloose Entrepreneur model (FE) vari-
ant. We assumed specific first nature differences: the four regions are aligned,
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the first and the third regions are of smaller size and the second and the
fourth ones of a larger size; regions one and two (and regions three and four)
are geographically and/or culturally closer to each other than to the outside
neighbors – as a stylized representation of some real world cases (South Italy
- North Italy - Austria - Germany or Canada - USA - Mexico - Latin Amer-
ica). Our objective was to explore: i) the effect of regional integration within
an integrated area in the presence of an outside integrated bloc; ii) the effect
of trade liberalization between integrated blocs; and finally, iii) the impact of
changing transport costs on transit traffic.
The first nature characteristics of the model allowed us to disentangle two
different aspects of the market access effect: the size of the local market – a
feature already captured by the standard 2-region asymmetric FE model –
and the centrality of some regions. Moreover, our extended setup has shown
that, depending on parameter values, the model is able to generate a large
variety of long-run outcomes. We have obtained four possible core-periphery
equilibria: agglomeration can occur in the two central or the two remote re-
gions, in the two small or in the two large regions. We determined analytically
(when possible) the ranking of the core-periphery equilibria for each region
in terms of real wages, the effect of trade costs on the remuneration of (im-
mobile) workers and the nominal/real profits of (mobile) entrepreneurs. The
main conclusion is that workers are better off in regions with a better access to
commodity markets (of both blocs). In most cases, trade integration (between
and within blocs) increases the real profits of entrepreneurs. Also, nominal
profits in central regions or in the large remote region are higher when the
industry agglomeration in the other bloc is far away. More generally, the de-
gree of trade integration (between or within blocs) may alter in a non trivial
way entrepreneurial remunerations as they result from the effects of central-
ity, market size, and competition. When the latter effect dominates, industry
agglomerates in the regions that are at the fringe in our geographical line-up.
Moreover, our results extend those of the 2-region FE model in two other
directions. First, the coexistence of feasible long-run outcomes goes beyond
the coexistence of stable core-periphery equilibria. We have been able to de-
tect situations in which industry is agglomerated in a bloc but dispersed in
the other one due to the interplay between the agglomeration and dispersion
forces mentioned above. These results cannot emerge in simpler setups. Sec-
ond, instances of multistability arise. This allows us to focus the study on
cumulative causation, positive feed-back processes, locational hysteresis, and
path dependence, which provides an evolutionary perspective to our results.
Finally we have been able to derive implications of the model on transit
traffic for which multistabilty is of crucial relevance. With its explicit focus on
location choice (and trade volumes), the NEG approach provides a comple-
mentary approach to other studies that focus on trade volume and the so-called
modal split. Typically, an increase in trade costs reduces transit traffic - this
is also the case in our model in each of the equilibria. However, due to the per-
vasiveness of multistability in NEG models, an increase in trade costs might
actually induce upward jumps in transit traffic as a consequence of industry
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relocation across regions which arises when the economy switches from one to
a different core-periphery equilibrium.
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Appendix A
In (15) profits pii for i = 1, 4, are defined as follows:
pi1 =
A1(1− C2) +A2C1
(1−B1)(1− C2)−B2C1 , pi2 =
A2(1−B1) +A1B2
(1−B1)(1− C2)−B2C1 ,
pi3 =
A3(1−B4) +A4B3
(1− C3)(1−B4)−B3C4 , pi4 =
A4(1− C3) +A3C4
(1− C3)(1−B4)−B3C4 ,
where
A1 = (Θ1 + φCφDhbβ3Q3Θ3)Q1, A2 = (Θ2 + φDhbβ3Q3Θ3)Q2,
A3 =
(
Ω3 + φDh˜bβ2M2Ω2
)
M3, A4 =
(
Ω4 + φCφDh˜bβ2M2Ω2
)
M4,
B1 =
(
φ2Cφ
2
Dh
2
bβ1β3Q3
)
Q1, B2 = φCβ1(ha + φ
2
Dh
2
bβ3Q3)Q2,
B3 = φCβ4(h˜a + φ
2
Dh˜
2
bβ2M2)M3, B4 =
(
φ2Cφ
2
Dh˜
2
bβ2β4M2
)
M4,
C1 = φCβ2(ha + φ
2
Dh
2
bβ3Q3)Q1, C2 = φ
2
Dh
2
bβ2β3Q2Q3,
C3 = φ
2
Dh˜
2
bβ2β3M2M3, C4 = φCβ3(h˜a + φ
2
Dh˜
2
bβ2M3)M4,
Θ1 = α1z1 + φCα2z2 + φCφDα3z3 + φ
2
CφDα4z4,
Θ2 = (φCα1 + α2)z2 + φDα3z3 + φCφDα4z4,
Θ3 = (φCφDα1 + φDα2 + α3)z3 + φCα4z4,
Ω2 = φCα1z˜1 + (φCφDα4 + φDα3 + α2)z˜2,
Ω3 = φCφDα1z˜1 + φDα2z˜2 + (α3 + φCα4)z˜3,
Ω4 = φ
2
CφDα1z˜1 + φCφDα2z˜2 + φCα3z˜3 + α4z˜4,
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Q1 =
1
1
κ − β1 (1 + φ4Cφ2Dz4κβ4)
, Q2 =
1
1
κ − β2ha
, Q3 =
1
1
κ − β3hb
,
M2 =
1
1
κ − β2h˜b
, M3 =
1
1
κ − β3h˜a
, M4 =
1
1
κ − β4 (1 + φ4Cφ2D z˜1κβ1)
,
α1 =
Ls
∆1
, α2 =
Lb
∆2
, α3 =
Ls
∆3
, α4 =
Lb
∆4
,
β1 =
x
∆1
E
2
, β2 =
1− x
∆2
E
2
, β3 =
y
∆3
E
2
, β4 =
1− y
∆4
E
2
,
κ =
2µ
σE
,
z1 = z4
(
1− κβ4(1− φ4Cφ2D)
)
, z2 = z4
(
1− κβ4(1− φ2Cφ2D)
)
,
z3 = z4
(
1− κβ4(1− φ2C)
)
, z4 =
1
1− κβ4 ,
z˜1 =
1
1− κβ1 , z˜2 = z˜1
(
1− κβ1(1− φ2C)
)
,
z˜3 = z˜1
(
1− κβ1(1− φ2Cφ2D)
)
, z˜4 = z˜1
(
1− κβ1(1− φ4Cφ2D)
)
,
ha = 1 + φ
2
Cφ
2
Dz4κβ4, hb = 1 + φ
2
Cz4κβ4,
h˜a = 1 + φ
2
Cφ
2
D z˜1κβ1, h˜b = 1 + φ
2
C z˜1κβ1.
Appendix B
The borders of the unit square I2 are denoted as follows:
Ix0 = {(x, y) : y = 0} , Ix1 = {(x, y) : y = 1} ,
I0y = {(x, y) : x = 0} , I1y = {(x, y) : x = 1} .
It is easy to see that these borders are invariant under map Z. Moreover, on
each of these borders 2D map Z is reduced to the corresponding 1D map.
Namely,
- on border Ix0 map Z is reduced to a 1D map, denoted zx0, which is
defined as
zx0 : x 7→ zx0(x) =
 0 if Zh0(x) < 0,Zh0(x) if 0 ≤ Zh0(x) ≤ 1,
1 if Zh0(x) > 1,
where
Zh0(x) = x
[
1 + γ(1− x) Ωh(x, 0)− 1
1 + x(Ωh(x, 0)− 1)
]
; (28)
- on border Ix1 map Z is reduced to a 1D map, denoted zx1, which is
defined as
zx1 : x 7→ zx1(x) =
 0 if Zh1(x) < 0,Zh1(x) if 0 ≤ Zh1(x) ≤ 1,
1 if Zh1(x) > 1,
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where
Zh1(x) = x
[
1 + γ(1− x) Ωh(x, 1)− 1
1 + x(Ωh(x, 1)− 1)
]
; (29)
- on border I0y map Z is reduced to a 1D map
z0y : y 7→ z0y(y) =
 0 if Zf0(y) < 0,Zf0(y) if 0 ≤ Zf0(y) ≤ 1,
1 if Zf0(y) > 1,
where
Zf0(y) = y
[
1 + γ(1− y) Ωf (0, y)− 1
1 + y(Ωf (0, y)− 1)
]
; (30)
- and, finally, on border I1y the map Z is reduced to a 1D map
z1y : y 7→ z1y(y) =
 0 if Zf1(y) < 0,Zf1(y) if 0 ≤ Zf1(y) ≤ 1,
1 if Zf1(y) > 1,
where
Zf1(y) = y
[
1 + γ(1− y) Ωf (1, y)− 1
1 + y(Ωf (1, y)− 1)
]
. (31)
Appendix C
Jacobian matrix of map Z (in its central part, without constraints) is given
by
DZ =
(
Zh
′
x(x, y) Zh
′
y(x, y)
Zf
′
x(x, y) Zf
′
y(x, y)
)
,
where
Zh
′
x(x, y) = 1+γ
(
(1− 2x) Ωh(x, y)− 1
1 + x(Ωh(x, y)− 1) + x(1− x)
Ωh
′
x(x, y)− (Ωh(x, y)− 1)2
(1 + x(Ωh(x, y)− 1))2
)
,
Zh
′
y(x, y) = γx(1− x)
Ωh
′
y(x, y)
(1 + x(Ωh(x, y)− 1))2
,
Zf
′
x(x, y) = γy(1− y)
Ωf
′
x(x, y)
(1 + y(Ωf (x, y)− 1))2
,
Zf
′
y(x, y) = 1+γ
(
(1− 2y) Ωf (x, y)− 1
1 + y(Ωf (x, y)− 1) + y(1− y)
Ωf
′
y(x, y)− (Ωf (x, y)− 1)2
(1 + y(Ωf (x, y)− 1))2
)
.
The eigenvalues are
λ1,2(x, y) = 0.5
(
Zh
′
x(x, y) + Zf
′
y(x, y)±
√
(Zh′x(x, y)− Zf ′y(x, y))2 + 4Zh′y(x, y)Zf ′x(x, y)
)
.
We use the following notations: λ1(x, y) = λh(x, y) and λ2(x, y) = λv(x, y).
Eigenvalues of the fixed points of map Z are as follows:
CP00 : λh(0, 0) = 1 + γ(Ωh(0, 0)− 1), λv(0, 0) = 1 + γ(Ωf (0, 0)− 1),
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CP11 : λh(1, 1) = 1− γ
(
1− 1
Ωh(0, 0)
)
, λv(1, 1) = 1− γ
(
1− 1
Ωf (0, 0)
)
,
CP01 : λh(0, 1) = 1 + γ(Ωh(0, 1)− 1), λv(0, 1) = 1− γ
(
1− 1
Ωf (0, 1)
)
,
CP10 : λh(1, 0) = 1− γ
(
1− 1
Ωh(1, 0)
)
, λv(1, 0) = 1 + γ(Ωf (1, 0)− 1),
BP0a : λh(0, a) = 1 + γ(Ωh(0, a)− 1), λv(0, a) = 1 + γa(1− a)Ωf ′y(0, a),
BP1a : λh(1, a) = 1− γ
(
1− 1
Ωh(1, a)
)
, λv(1, a) = 1 + γa(1− a)Ωf ′y(1, a),
BPa0 : λh(a, 0) = 1 + γa(1− a)Ωh′x(a, 0), λv(a, 0) = 1 + γ(Ωf (a, 0)− 1),
BPa1 : λh(a, 1) = 1 + γa(1− a)Ωh′x(a, 1), λv(a, 1) = 1− γ
(
1− 1
Ωf (a, 1)
)
,
IPab : λh,v(a, b) = 1 + 0.5γ(a(1− a)Ωh′x(a, b) + b(1− b)Ωf ′y(a, b)±√
(a(1− a)Ωh′x(a, b)− b(1− b)Ωf ′y(a, b))2 + 4a(1− a)b(1− b)Ωh′y(a, b)Ωf ′x(a, b)).
